Vego (2000) defines Desired End State (DES) as a “broadly expresses political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, ethnic, humanitarian, and other conditions that the highest political leadership of national or alliance coalition forces wants in a given theater after the end of hostilities.” Some military operations may be conducted to achieve a specific purpose – objective – but may only represent a portion of the DES. “Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of military operations need to be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power, such as political negotiations, and focused on common goals.” (Joint Publication 3-0) Such was the case with the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict. Argentina envisioned a clearly defined military objective, which was to retake the Falkland/Malvinas Island by overwhelming the British. Nevertheless, their inability to identify a DES resulted in inadequate intelligence and relatively no follow-on planning. Gatchel (2001) affirms that “Argentine decisions or lack of [the] same resulted in no comprehensive defensive strategy or operational plans.” The Argentines successfully accomplished their military objective but made no provisions for a DES such as sustained defense against Britain. Gatchel continues and points out why Britain was not compelled to negotiate a settlement due to the Argentines “lack of any strategic planning, and ultimately the lack of any strategy, hamstrung [their] forces, handing the initiative to the enemy.”

Success vs. Effectiveness

“The political object - original motive for the war - will determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement.” Carl Von Clausewitz – On War (p. 81)